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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD V. MURPHY OIL USA, INC.:
A TEST OF MIGHT
ELIZABETH STOREY*
INTRODUCTION
National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.1 presents
a conflict between two long-standing federal statutes in the context of
employment contracts.2 The class action waivers at issue in this case
involve arbitration agreements in which employees waive any right to
collective action over legal disputes with their employers in any
forum. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“NLRA”) and the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”), each with its own set of
underlying interests, have come head to head. Foreclosing the option
of collective action offends the former, while failure to enforce an
arbitration agreement undermines the latter. The Supreme Court is no
stranger to challenges against the FAA. It has yet, however, to decide
a case in which enforcing the FAA might risk directly violating an
equally powerful federal law. As each side contemplates the conflicts,
compatibility, and potential inapplicability of the statutes in relation
to the waivers at issue, the Supreme Court faces a question of policy.
Its decision will likely depend on whether it applies one of the two
exceptions available to the mandate on arbitration enforcement. But
the Court must recognize the policy concerns at stake. Ultimately,
ruling against the employees’ interests risks a greater harm to them
than against Respondents’ interest in maintaining strong arbitration
rights in this particular context.

Copyright © 2017 Elizabeth Storey.
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2019.
1. N.L.R.B. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 809 (Jan. 13, 2017) (No. 16-307).
2. Three separate matters have been consolidated into this case: (1) Murphy Oil USA,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015); (2) Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th
Cir. 2016); and (3) Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). This
commentary focuses only on the primary matter, Murphy Oil, in the interest of clarity.
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I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November 2008, Sheila Hobson signed an arbitration
agreement in connection with her application to work at a Murphy
Oil gas station in Calera, Alabama.3 Murphy Oil USA, Inc., a national
company, operates retail gas stations in 26 states.4 Murphy Oil
required all applicants and current employees, like Hobson, to sign
the binding arbitration agreement at issue in this case.
By signing this contract, Hobson waived her right to pursue legal
action over disputes relating to her employment in court, agreeing
that any such claim would be brought in an arbitral forum.5 The
contract specified that the disputes might involve violations of state or
federal statutes, including alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”).6 Hobson also waived her right to collective
action by signing the contract, which mandated that any claim be
pursued individually: “Individual and the Company waive their right
to commence, be a party to, or [act as a] class member [in, any class]
or collective action . . . against the other party relating to employment
issues . . . in arbitration or any other forum.”7 As such, she would not
be permitted to consolidate any claims or join in an action with
another employee.8 The arbitration provision concluded:
“INDIVIDUAL AND COMPANY UNDERSTAND THAT,
ABSENT THIS AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD HAVE THE
RIGHT TO SUE EACH OTHER IN COURT, TO INITIATE OR
BE A PARTY TO A GROUP OR CLASS CLAIM.”9
Hobson worked at the Murphy Oil gas station from November
2008 until September 2010.10 In June 2010, Hobson, with three other
Murphy Oil employees, filed a collective action suit against the
company in the United States District Court for the Northern District
3. Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1015.
4. Brief for Respondent at 4, N.L.R.B. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 809 (June 9,
2017) (No. 16-307), 2017 WL 2591012, at *4 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, N.L.R.B. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 809
(No. 16-307), 2016 WL 4761717, at *3 [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (“Excluding
claims which must, by statute or other law, be resolved in other forums, Company and
Individual agree to resolve any and all disputes . . . which relate in any manner whatsoever as to
Individual’s employment . . . by binding arbitration.”).
6. Id. at app. 25a.
7. Id. at app. 25a–26a.
8. Id. at app. 25a (“The parties agree that any claim by or against Individual or the
Company shall be heard without consolidation of such claim with any other person or entity’s
claim.”).
9. Id. at app. 25a–26a.
10. Id. at app. 26a.
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of Alabama.11 Their complaint alleged that, in violation of the FLSA,
the company failed to compensate the employees for overtime and
other work-related activities.12
In July 2010, Murphy Oil filed a motion to compel the plaintiffemployees to submit their claims separately in individual arbitration
actions, pursuant to each arbitration agreement the plaintiffs signed,
and to dismiss the suit altogether.13 The plaintiff-employees opposed
the motion, arguing that the FLSA protected their substantive right to
collective action, thus making their signed arbitration agreements
unenforceable.14 They also argued that enforcement of the arbitration
agreements would interfere with their right to engage in concerted
activity, protected by § 715 of the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”).16
In January 2011, while the defendant-employers’ motion was
pending, Hobson filed an unfair labor practice claim with the National
Labor Relations Board (the “Board”).17 Hobson’s complaint with the
Board alleged that Murphy Oil had violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA
by “maintaining and enforcing a mandatory arbitration agreement
that prohibits employees from engaging in protected, concerted
activities.”18 The Board postponed a hearing on the complaint while it
considered another similar action.19
In January 2012, as Hobson’s hearing was pending, the Board
issued an opinion in a separate action that would be determinative in

11. Id.
12. Id. at app. 27a; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1939, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012)).
13. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 2015).
14. Id.
15. The relevant briefs and opinions in this case refer to the various provisions in the
NLRA interchangeably as sections codified in the individual act and the United States Code.
So, “§ 7” also refers to 29 U.S.C. § 157. This Commentary will also refer to these sections
interchangeably.
16. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (2012); Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at
1015–16.
17. See Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1016. See also 29 U.S.C §§ 153, 160 (discussing the powers
and review procedure of the Board, and procedure for employees to file charges).
18. Petition for Writ Certiorari, supra note 5, at app. 27a. Hobson’s complaint with the
NLRB also alleged that the arbitration agreement’s language “would lead employees
reasonably to believe that they were prohibited from filing unfair labor practice charges with the
Board.” The Fifth Circuit addressed this allegation in its opinion, ruling that a revised version of
the language was not problematic. Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1020. That issue and analysis will not
be addressed further in this Commentary.
19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at app. 27a.
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Hobson’s complaint.20 In its D.R. Horton decision, the Board held that
an employer violates the NLRA by requiring employees to waive
their right to pursue class and collective claims, and mandating
individual arbitration.21 These arbitration agreements restrict
employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity.22 D.R.
Horton appealed that decision in the Fifth Circuit.23 In December
2013, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Board’s decision as it related to
waivers of collection action in arbitration agreements, holding that
those agreements do not violate any substantive right in the NLRA.24
In September 2012, an Alabama district court granted the
defendant-employers’ motion to compel, requiring that the plaintiffemployees submit their claims to arbitration, pursuant to their
employment agreements.25 The plaintiff-employees did not comply,
and the defendant-employers refused to arbitrate their claims on a
collective basis.26 Eventually, the plaintiff-employees moved for
reconsideration of the order compelling arbitration, which the district
court denied with prejudice.27
In October 2014, the Board ruled in favor of Hobson, reaffirming
its own D.R. Horton decision and disregarding the Fifth Circuit’s D.R.
Horton opinion.28 The Board held that by “requiring its employees to
agree to resolve all employment-related claims through individual
arbitration, and by taking steps to enforce the unlawful agreements in
the federal district court,” Murphy Oil violated § 8(a)(1).29 Murphy
Oil filed a timely appeal in the Fifth Circuit to review the Board’s

20. See Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1016.
21. Id. (citing In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3,
2012)).
22. Id.; see N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 841 (1984) (the NLRB
“recognizes as concerted activity an individual employee’s reasonable and honest invocation of
a right provided for in his collective-bargaining agreement” or other activity in pursuit of the
rights provided for in the NRLA).
23. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013).
24. See id.
25. Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1016.
26. Id. at 1016 n.1.
27. Id. (citing Hobson v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. CV-10-S-1486, 2015 WL 4111661, at
*3 (N.D. Ala. July 8, 2015)). The plaintiff-employees filed an appeal, which is pending before
the Eleventh Circuit.
28. Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1017. The Board prescribed several remedies to correct the
violations, including: revising or rescinding the arbitration agreement; posting a notice of their
violations at the Murphy Oil facilities; and reimbursing the plaintiff-employees for the
attorneys’ fees incurred in opposing the defendant-employers motion in the Alabama district
court, among other actions.
29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 8.
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decision in Hobson’s case.30 After the Fifth Circuit reversed the
Board’s Hobson decision, the Board filed a writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court to review the Fifth Circuit’s judgment.31
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The questions presented in Murphy Oil implicate a variety of
statutes, precedents, and institutional bodies that either directly or
indirectly regulate employment contracts.32 As such, it is helpful to
take each in turn to understand how they have come to a head in this
case.
A. The National Labor Relations Act and the National Labor
Relations Board
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“NLRA”), codified in
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169, was enacted to protect “the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association . . . for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.”33 Under § 157, employees are granted the right “to selforganization . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”34
To enforce, monitor, and provide relief for violations of the
NLRA, Congress created the National Labor Relations Board as an
agency of the United States, which “asserts a public right vested in it
as a public body, charged in the public interest with the duty of
preventing unfair labor practices.”35 Although the Board’s decisions
are reviewable by the federal judiciary, 36 the Board has the power to

30. Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1017.
31. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 1.
32. See generally id.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012); Brief for Petitioner at 56, N.L.R.B. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 809 (Aug. 9, 2017) (No. 16-307), 2017 WL 3447770, at *56 [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioner].
34. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
35. Nat’l Licorice Co. v. N.L.R.B., 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940). See also 29 U.S.C. § 151
(stating that Congress established the National Labor Relations Board in an effort to relieve
obstruction to the free flow of commerce by “encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection”).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a). See also Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 568 (1978) (holding
that the task of “attempt[ing] to delineate precisely the boundaries of the mutual aid or
protection clause” is for the “Board to perform in the first instance”).
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prevent persons from engaging in unfair labor practice, provided in §
158.37
Section 158 defines “unfair labor practices” to include the
interference with, restraint, or coercion of “employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in § 157.”38 The Supreme Court has stated that
§ 157 protects employees’ rights to “seek to improve working
conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums.”39
Furthermore, in J.I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B.,40 the Court recognized that
“wherever private contracts conflict with” the functions of the NLRA,
“they obviously must yield or the Act would be reduced to a
futility.”41 Therefore, the NLRA jurisprudence demonstrates how the
Supreme Court has shown its commitment to effectuating Congress’s
strong interest in protecting employees’ collective action rights.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that contractual
provisions requiring disputes be settled by arbitration “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
inequity for the revocation of any contract.”42 Congress enacted the
FAA in 1925 in an effort to place “private arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other contracts” by mandating judicial
enforcement.43 There are two exceptions to this mandate: (1) the
saving clause, and (2) the finding of a contrary congressional
command.
The saving clause, beginning “save upon . . . ,” allows arbitration
agreements to be invalidated when contract law would normally
invalidate an agreement, like in the case of fraud.44 An arbitration
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e)–(f).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 158 .
39. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565.
40. 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (holding that the collective bargaining agreement between a union
and company properly superseded the series of individual contracts between the employees and
the company based on the NLRA’s jurisdiction).
41. Id. at 337.
42. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
43. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (holding that a claim
pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was subject to compulsory arbitration
as provided in a securities registration application and as required under the FAA). The Court
noted that the petitioner was “bound by his agreement to arbitrate unless he [could] show an
inherent conflict between arbitration and the ADEA’s underlying purposes.” Id. at 20.
44. See Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017) (asserting
that the FAA prevents any state law from outrightly prohibiting arbitration on its face or from
“covertly accomplish[ing] the same objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally)
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agreement is defined by its waiver of the right to seek relief in court
and receive a jury trial.45 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the FAA’s protection of the right to an arbitral
forum may not come at the expense of the substantive rights
protected by the statute in the saving clause.46 If a challenge to the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement does not fall under the
saving clause, then a party opposed to arbitration must show “a
contrary congressional command” to overcome the congressional
policy favoring arbitration.47 Specifically, there must be evidence that
“Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue,” which may be discerned from that statute’s
legislative history, text, or underlying purpose.48
The FAA often preempts any conflicting state law on the grounds
that federal policy strongly favors arbitration agreements, and its
saving clause will not be construed to undermine the purpose of the
FAA.49 In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (“Concepcion”), the
Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted a California judicial
rule that outlawed class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts
because of unconscionability.50 The Court found that the FAA’s
underlying policy interests heavily favored protecting the benefits of
have the defining features of arbitration agreements”).
45. See id. at 1427 (explaining that the Kentucky Supreme Court acted contrary to an
outright AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion prohibition in adopting a legal rule that
discriminated against the primary characteristic of an arbitration agreement: “a waiver of the
right to go to court and receive a jury trial”).
46. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
47. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (holding that
a court’s duty to rigorously enforce arbitration agreements is “not diminished when a party
bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights”). See also Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (“Just as it is the congressional
policy manifested in the [FAA] that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration
agreements covered by that Act, it is the congressional intention expressed in some other
statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to which agreements
to arbitrate will be held unenforceable.”)
48. Shearson, 482 U.S. at 226–27.
49. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (Concepcion), 563 U.S. 333, 345–46 (2011)
(citation omitted) (“[O]ur cases place it beyond dispute that the FAA was designed to promote
arbitration. They have repeatedly described the Act as embo[dying] [a] national policy favoring
arbitration . . . and a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”). See also Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (“In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts,
Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.”).
50. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341–42. The Court noted that “nothing in [the saving clause]
suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the FAA’s objectives.” Id. at 343.
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the streamlined proceedings available when parties design their own
arbitration processes.51 In fact, it found that “[r]equiring the
availability of class-wide arbitration interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration . . . creat[ing] a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA.”52 Citing earlier precedent, the Court also noted that permitting
class-wide arbitration when a contract is silent on the issue is
inconsistent with the FAA because of the various formal procedures
that such actions require.53 Further, the Court included several
concerns it had over the compatibility of arbitration and class-wide
proceedings.54
C. The Board’s Decision in D.R. Horton
In D.R. Horton, the Board reviewed a petition regarding
individual-arbitration mandates in employment contracts.55 The
employer-respondent argued that non-enforcement of this contract
violated the FAA.56 As in the present case, the employee-petitioner
argued that enforcing the arbitration agreement violates the
protection of the substantive right of collective action, as provided in
the NLRA.57 When two federal statutes present this type of conflict,
the reviewer is required to try to accommodate them.58 Unless there
exists a “clearly express congressional intention to the contrary,” the
two statutes must be construed to co-exist with each other.59
The Board found that arbitration is a satisfactory substitute for a
judicial forum only if a litigant can effectively vindicate his rights.60
Additionally, the FAA’s saving clause permitted it and the NLRA to
co-exist, as it provides for the invalidation of any arbitration
agreement that is otherwise revocable upon grounds in law or
equity.61 Accordingly, finding that the NLRA grants a substantive
51. See id. at 344–45 (requiring, for instance, that arbitration be individual).
52. Id. at 344.
53. Id. at 347–48 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681–
82 (2010)).
54. See id. at 349–51 (opining that class-wide arbitration lacks the informality and low cost,
and increases risk to the defendants).
55. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at 2277, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012).
56. Id. at 2284.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942)).
59. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“[W]hen two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the
contrary, to regard each as effective.”).
60. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2285.
61. Id. at 2286–87.
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right to collective action, the Board held that individual-arbitration
agreements violate the NLRA by mandating that employees waive
their rights to seek relief from employment-related claims collectively
in all forums.62 This type of interference by an employer in the
engagement of concerted activity exempts those agreements from the
FAA’s enforcement requirement.63
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision in D.R. Horton
and overturned it, holding that the NLRA does not fall within the
saving clause, or override the FAA with any congressional command,
or grant a substantive right to class action procedures.64 In Murphy
Oil, the Board followed its own precedent, holding that the arbitration
agreements signed by Hobson and her colleagues violated the
NLRA.65 Upon review, the Fifth Circuit followed its ruling in D.R.
Horton, again rejecting the Board’s conclusions.66
III. HOLDING
In Murphy Oil, the Fifth Circuit held that Murphy Oil did not
commit an unfair labor practice by mandating that employees waive
their NLRA-granted rights to seek class or collective action claims in
all forums, relying on its reasoning in D.R. Horton.67 The D.R. Horton
court found that the Board’s rejection of that case’s arbitration
agreement did not reflect the proper weight of the FAA.68 While the
Board held that the “NLRA invalidates any bar to class arbitrations,”
the court explained that “the use of class action procedures . . . is not a
substantive right,” but a procedural one.69 The court stated that the
Board wrongly put the policy considerations of the NLRA ahead of
those in the FAA by finding the statutes compatible, given two
exceptions to the congressional mandate of arbitral enforcement: (1)

62. Id. at 2288.
63. Id. at 2281.
64. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013, 1016 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[A]n
employer does not engage in unfair labor practices by maintaining and enforcing an arbitration
agreement prohibiting employee class or collective actions and requiring employment-related
claims to be resolved through individual arbitration.”).
65. Id. at 1017.
66. Id. at 1017–18.
67. Id. at 1017–21. The Fifth Circuit also held that if an arbitration agreement is
reasonably construed to prohibit a filing of unfair labor practice charges with the Board, than it
violates the NLRA. Id. at 1019. However, one that expressly affirms an employee’s right to file
an unfair labor practices claim with the Board does not. Id.
68. D.R. Horton, Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013).
69. Id. at 357.
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the saving clause, and (2) the finding of another statute’s contrary
congressional command.70
The court found that the saving clause could not be a basis for
prohibiting class action waivers because that reasoning would
completely undermine the purposes of the FAA.71 Specifically,
“[r]equiring a class mechanism” impedes the benefits of arbitration by
formalizing and slowing what otherwise would be a thorough,
individualized, and less costly process to adjudicate claims.72 Allowing
an option for class action in employment contracts would discourage
employers from using individual arbitration at all.73
Furthermore, the court did not find a contrary congressional
command to override the FAA in the NLRA.74 Deferring significantly
to the federal policy favoring arbitration,75 the court did not recognize
any such mandate in the NLRA, especially because the statute does
not explicitly provide for the right or procedures associated with this
type of collective action.76 Similarly, the court did not find that the
NLRA’s legislative history demonstrated Congress’s intent to
override the FAA.77 Finally, it found no inherent conflict between the
two statutes, as case law and Board practice have consistently shown
that arbitration agreements in employment contracts were lawful and
compatible with the NLRA.78
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the arbitration
agreement must be enforced because the Board failed to show either
that the NLRA granted a substantive right, that the NLRA fell within
the saving clause, or that the NLRA presented a sufficient contrary
congressional command to override the policy concerns behind the

70. Id. at 358 (noting that “[t]he Board clearly relied on the FAA’s saving clause. Less
clear is whether the Board also asserted that a contrary congressional command is present”).
71. Id. at 359–60.
72. Id. at 360.
73. Id. at 359.
74. Id. at 360 (“[T]here is no basis on which to find that the text of the NLRA supports a
congressional command to override the FAA.”).
75. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing Moses H.
Come Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (“[I]t should be kept in
mind that ‘questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal
policy favoring arbitration.’”).
76. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 360 (noting that the NLRA’s text, “mutual aid or protection,”
did not implicate either express or strongly implied congressional intent, reasoning that other
cases presented more convincing arguments and were still subsequently rejected as lacking a
sufficient overriding congressional command).
77. Id. at 361.
78. See id.
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FAA.79 Following the same line of reasoning, the Murphy Oil court
held that the arbitration agreement at issue was enforceable, and
accordingly overturned the Board’s decision.80
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioners’ Argument
Petitioners argue that collective action waivers, like the one at
issue here, deprive employees of the opportunity to choose how to
initiate or participate in a dispute against an employer.81 The waiver
prevents them from acting concertedly for the mutual aid or
protection of each other, which the NLRA grants as a right.82 Because
the initial claim concerned a FLSA violation, it falls within the
NLRA’s jurisdiction.83 Petitioners assert that an employees’ right to
pursue legal claims as a class is substantive and reflects a fundamental
right to freely associate.84 The Board does not dispute that violations
of the FLSA may be heard in an arbitral forum in some cases,85 but it
protests any requirement imposed upon an employee to resolve workrelated legal disputes on an individual basis.86
Furthermore, according to Petitioners, it is consistent with the
policies motivating the NLRA to read § 158(a)(1) as prohibitive of
waivers of § 157 rights.87 The NLRA was, in part, passed to address the

79. Id. at 362.
80. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015).
81. See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33. Hobson also submitted a brief on
behalf of the N.L.R.B., but it will not be considered here. This summary of Petitioners’
arguments is not exhaustive. Rather, it is an overview of the most salient points. See id. at 8.
Petitioners argue that prospective waivers of § 157 rights “deprive employees of the opportunity
to decide, when a dispute arises, whether to proceed alone or to initiate or join a concerted
response.” Id. Furthermore, individual waivers prevent individual employees from engaging in
concerted activities “one by one.” Id.
82. Id. at 11–12.
83. See id. at 31–32 (“[T]he NLRA and the FLSA establish separate rights and
protections, which coexist and apply simultaneously to all employees who qualify for protection
under both statutes. Because the NLRA applies at the time an arbitration agreement is signed,
it invalidates and prohibits any prospective waiver of protected concerted activity, including one
barring concerted proceedings under FLSA Section 216(b).”).
84. See id. at 11–12 (asserting that “Congress enacted the NLRA to protect employees’
‘full freedom of association’ to join together to advance their interests as employees . . . Section
157 implements the core objectives of the NLRA by guaranteeing” protection of activities
related to self-organization and “other concerted activities”).
85. See id. at 9 (acknowledging that despite their “hostility towards arbitration . . . the
Board recognizes [it] as an effective forum for vindicating federal laws”).
86. Id.
87. See id. at 22–24. Petitioners briefly describe the court’s history aligning with the
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power imbalance between employees and their employers.88 Because
the NLRA enables employees to pursue claims against employers
who would otherwise be able to capitalize on the power imbalance by
committing unfair labor practices, it follows that a waiver that
breaches this safeguard is not permissible.89 By limiting an employee’s
access to collective action rights under the NLRA, an employer
infringes upon an interest that is closely associated with the freedom
to associate.90
Additionally, Petitioners argue that the class action waivers are
unenforceable under the FAA’s saving clause.91 In addressing the
Fifth Circuit’s contention that Concepcion rejects this assertion,
Petitioners explain that Congress included the FAA saving clause to
permit the restriction of arbitration where the agreement is invalid.92
Therefore, because the agreement here violates a coequal federal
statute, and not a state law like in Concepcion, it must be invalid.93
Petitioners also addressed the apparent inconsistency between their
position and the holding in Concepcion,94 which viewed a rule
mandating the option for class-wide arbitration as incompatible with
the FAA.95 Petitioners respond that preserving the option for
employees to engage in collective action in some forum does not
impede the equally valued option to individual arbitration.96 They rely
upon Eastex Inc. to assert that a forum, either judicial or arbitral, must
be available to employees to settle grievances as a group.97 This
interpretation properly leaves the choice with employees, and
employer’s interests in mitigating the labor unions’ power. Id. at 23–24. In the 1930s, Congress
sought to protect employees’ interests by restricting federal courts’ jurisdiction to grant labor
injunctions and expanding federal labor protections through the NLRA. Id. at 22–23.
Petitioners argue that the Court has already supported a reading of § 158(a) strongly linked to §
157 rights because contracts that restricted § 157 rights were a “continuing means of thwarting
the policy of the [NLRA].” Id. at 24 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
89. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 22–24.
90. Id. at 7.
91. Id. at 35–46.
92. Id. at 41.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 39–44.
95. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (Concepcion), 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
96. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 42 (asserting that an employer may still be
able to “insist that any arbitral proceedings be conducted on an individual basis, provided it
leaves open a judicial forum for collective action”).
97. Id. at 7. See also Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978) (rejecting the view
that “employees lose their protection under the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause when they
seek to improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as
employees through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship”).
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prevents the violation of an explicit prohibition provided in a coequal
federal statute, and comports with the saving clause.98 Relatedly,
Petitioners also reject the Fifth Circuit’s contention that prohibiting
these class action waivers defeats the purpose of the FAA, which is to
put arbitration agreements “on equal footing.”99 Rather, Petitioners
argue that invoking the saving clause here permits the FAA and
NLRA to both be effectuated, and recognizes the statutory
exemptions the FAA has put in place for certain types of contracts.100
Furthermore, Petitioners assert that the long tradition of cases
failing to satisfy the high threshold for the FAA’s second exception,
the contrary congressional command, is not pertinent here because no
other case has involved a direct violation of another federal statute.101
Petitioners contend that the NLRA’s underlying policies support the
finding of a contrary congressional command that overrides that of
the FAA. In any case, Petitioners assert that “[a] valid agreement is a
threshold requirement for enforcement under § 2 of the FAA . . . [t]he
congressional-command test pre-supposes the existence of an
enforceable contract to arbitrate.”102 Because the agreement is illegal,
according to Petitioners, the Board’s decision in Hobson’s case must
be enforced.103 Ruling otherwise, they argue, would allow for the
contractual nullification of rights provided by any federal statute that
does not demonstrate a contrary congressional command.104
B. Respondents’ Argument
Respondents argue that collective action waivers at issue here are
valid arbitration agreements, and so must be enforced per the FAA.105
Respondents contend that the FAA and NLRA should be interpreted
harmoniously, given the NLRA’s failure to satisfy either of the two
exceptions to the FAA.106 Specifically, the statute does not fall within
98. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 10.
99. Id. at 44.
100. Id. at 44–45.
101. Id. at 47–51.
102. Id. at 47–48.
103. See id. at 50–52.
104. Id. at 51. See also id. at 55 (“[N]othing in the FAA so much as suggests that Congress
intended, in affirming the legitimacy of arbitration agreements as legally binding contracts, to
authorize private parties’ use of such agreements to evade their federal statutory obligations.”).
105. See generally Brief for Respondent, supra note 4. This summary of Respondents’
arguments is not exhaustive. Rather, it is an overview of their most salient points.
106. See id. at 39 (“Because the tools of statutory construction all point in the same
direction, the meaning of the NLRA is unambiguous: Section 7 does not confer a right to
‘engage in concerted activities’ by litigating as a class. At a minimum, there is no ‘clearly
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the saving clause of the FAA.107 Also, they argue that no sufficient
contrary congressional command exists to override the command of
the FAA.108 Respondents further assert that the NLRA does not
unambiguously refer to class proceedings or have jurisdiction over
arbitration agreements, like the one at issue here.109 Finally, they argue
that if the Court does not find the FAA and NLRA compatible, the
Court must favor the FAA.110
To deconstruct Petitioners’ argument that the saving clause must
be invoked because of the NLRA, Respondents present four reasons
that Petitioners’ interpretation is faulty.111 First, Respondents contend
that the saving clause only applies to “inferior” laws, and not to other
federal statutes.112 Because a coequal statute, like a federal one, does
not need to be saved to have effect, the saving clause may not apply.113
Second, the NLRA does not extend to “any” contract, as referred to
in the saving clause, but only ones between employer and employee.
This means that traditional contract defenses, like duress or illegality,
do not apply because the clause’s phrasing excludes defenses
available by another statute, like those in the NLRA.114 Third, in
promoting the policy underscoring the FAA, Respondents argue that
the saving clause may not apply for any reason that discriminates
against arbitration or its defining features,115 as such an application
would undermine the FAA’s purpose and interfere with the
“fundamental attributes” of arbitration.116 So, prohibiting class
waivers in arbitration agreements would undercut the FAA’s

expressed congressional intention’ that it does.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
107. Id. at 29.
108. Id. at 14.
109. Id. at 31.
110. Id. at 54–57.
111. Id. at 20–29.
112. Id. at 20.
113. Id. (citing N.L.R.B. v. Alt. Entm’t, Inc., No. 16-1385, 2017 WL 2297620, at *18 (6th Cir.
May 26, 2017) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
114. See id. at 21–24 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1984) (finding “a
party may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to avoid enforcement of an arbitration
agreement . . . [but] the defense to arbitration found in the [state statute at issue] is not a ground
that exists at law or in equity ‘for the revocation of any contract’ . . . . [R]ather it was, ‘merely a
ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to [the state
statute at issue]’”)); id. at 21.
115. Id. at 24 (quoting Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1423
(2017)).
116. Id. at 24–27 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (Concepcion), 563 U.S. 333,
344 (2011)).
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facilitation of efficient procedures tailored to the specific action at
hand.117 Finally, citing a concurring opinion in Concepcion,
Respondents suggest that the saving clause addresses the proper
formation of a contract,118 and as such, it would not be a ground to
prohibit class waivers under the NLRA, because the clause focuses on
revocation, and not nonenforcement.119
Respondents also argue that the NLRA does not contain any
clearly expressed contrary congressional intention that overrides the
interests of the FAA.120 They support this contention with a series of
cases in which courts have favored enforcing the FAA over other
statutes that have challenged it.121 They argue that “the pattern in
these cases is undeniable . . . the FAA unambiguously ‘mandate[d]
enforcement’ of the arbitration agreement at issue.”122 Respondents
support this assertion by pointing out that the only decision in which
the Supreme Court was unable to reconcile another statute with the
FAA, was eventually overruled.123 Additionally, when displacing the
FAA in other statutes, Congress has spoken with much more
specificity than it has in the NLRA, which does not mention the
waiver of class proceedings or arbitration at all.124 Moreover,
prohibiting class waivers, while addressing a peripheral NLRA
concern, would undermine the very core of the FAA’s protections.125
Respondents also discuss the text, legislative history, and underlying
purposes of the NLRA, concluding that nothing in these sources
117. Id. at 25 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344).
118. Id. at 28–29 (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 357) (Thomas, J., concurring) (considering
the history preceding the enactment of the FAA, contending that a 1923 New York court “tied
the concept of revocability to the ‘time of the [agreement’s] making’ – suggesting that the saving
clause’s concern was limited to whether the agreement was properly made. When Congress
enacted the FAA two year later, it was presumably aware of that authoritiative interpretation fo
the statute it was copying.”) (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 27–29 (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 354) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Because
the NLRA does not relate to contract formation, it is not a ground ‘for the revocation’ of a
contract within the meaning of the saving clause.”).
120. Id. at 14 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
121. See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (the
Court harmonized the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements with the Exchange
Act and RICO); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23–24 (1991) (the Court
found no contrary congressional command in CROA to override FAA’s mandate); Vimar
Seguro y Reasuguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1995) (the Court held that
the COGSA should be construed to avoid conflict with FAA’s mandate).
122. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 17 (citation omitted).
123. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearon/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479–85 (1985).
124. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 54–57.
125. Id. at 56.
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suggests that Congress intended for the NLRA to override the
FAA.126
Finally, Respondents examine the NLRA’s text to argue that
reading “concerted activities” as including class proceedings would
improperly impose an obligation on employers or third parties to
treat employees as a class, which is a procedural measure.127 It is not,
as Petitioners argue, a measure to prevent substantive interference by
employers.128 Additionally, Respondents argue that Congress did not
view class proceedings as necessary to effectuate the right to engage
in concerted activities.129 Asserting that outcomes of legal actions do
not depend on whether claims are brought individually or as a class,
Respondents dismiss the notion that waiving the option for class
action in both judicial and arbitral forums would deprive an employee
of any potential relief.130 It follows, then, that class action waivers do
not violate the NLRA.131 Regardless of any violation, however,
Respondents contend that the FAA’s command must be favored over
that of the NLRA because the former is more specific, and the Court
has only overridden the FAA when specific language has instructed it
to do so.132 They add that the “enforceability of class waivers forms
the core of the FAA.”133 Therefore, the FAA’s command must be
favored over that of the NLRA.134
V. ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit erred in ruling in favor of Respondents. The issue
before the Supreme Court, whether collective action waivers are
permissible in employment arbitration agreements, connects to a
broader question of how employees may freely associate with each
other to affect change in the workplace or seek relief for the wrongs
of their employers.135 The question is not merely procedural,136 and

126. Id. at 51–54.
127. Id. at 35–38.
128. See id. at 35.
129. Id. at 43.
130. Id. at 43–44.
131. Id. at 44.
132. Id. at 54–57.
133. Id. at 56.
134. Id. at 57.
135. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 2, 24–25.
136. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 47. Respondents argued that the right to
participate in class proceedings “is a procedural right only ancillary to the litigation of
substantive claims.” Id.
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substantive rights must not be eviscerated through dismantling
longstanding statutes, or picking and choosing some clauses while
disregarding others.137 The NLRA protects employees’ right to engage
in “concerted activities” for their “mutual aid or protection.”138
Therefore, holding that waivers of collective action in all forums in
employment contracts violate the rights granted in the NLRA is the
proper conclusion. To address the countervailing interest presented by
the FAA, the Court should invoke its main exception, the saving
clause, to preserve the equal strength of the competing statutes. But, if
the Court does not find that the saving clause applies, it should favor
the underlying policies of the NLRA, as the interests in the people’s
rights outweighs a general concern for informality and economy.
The saving clause of the FAA provides that an arbitration
agreement is legal and must be enforced, “save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”139 The
saving clause is included in the FAA to ensure that no illegal
arbitration agreement will be enforced, which maintains the integrity
of the arbitral forum. Nothing in the FAA or its jurisprudence
suggests that Congress intended for illegal agreements to be enforced
under the statute.140 Therefore, as Petitioners assert, because the class
action waivers in this case violate a right in the NLRA, it is imperative
to determine how the saving clause might be implicated here.
As Respondents contend, the saving clause is meant only to cover
generally applicable contract defenses, and not defenses unique to
certain statutes.141 However, Respondents misconstrue Petitioners’
137. This analysis will not address Respondents’ textual arguments, except to say: the
ability to bring a claim, in any forum, as a group, to seek relief for a work-related dispute falls
within these bounds. Despite the fact that the NLRA does not mention arbitration explicitly, it
also does not mention bringing a claim in any legal forum, judicial or otherwise, except in its
discussion of bringing a charge to the Board’s attention. It would be absurd to understand this
construction to be forgoing employees’ rights to bring a claim in a court of law. It is similarly
nonsensical to assume that it did not apply to arbitration, either. Therefore, Respondents’
argument that the NLRA is ambiguous to the extent that it does not expressly refer to “class
proceedings” or arbitration does not hold water, given that the ability for one or more
employees to initiate a class action on behalf of the group for an employment dispute falling
within the purview of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). There is no mention of class
proceedings in relation to concerted activities. Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 565–66
(1978) (explaining that “it has been held that the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause protects
employees from retaliation by their employers when they seek to improve working conditions
through resort to administrative and judicial forums.”).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
139. Id.
140. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24–26 (1991).
141. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 26–27 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v.
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argument, because Petitioners do not attempt to invoke a defense that
is provided for in the NLRA. Rather, they cite illegality as the
applicable contract defense. To determine whether an agreement must
be enforced under the FAA, the Court must consider the legality of a
contract as a threshold matter.142 Requiring that individual arbitration
be the only recourse for an employee who seeks to bring a workrelated dispute against her employer violates that employee’s right to
collective action. Petitioners argue that if the arbitral forum were left
available to the employee to pursue a class action, then waiving the
right to a judicial forum would not be problematic under the
NLRA.143 Therefore, because neither forum is available in the
agreement here, the agreement violates the NLRA and thereby is an
illegal contract. So, because illegality is an applicable contract defense
to enforcement, it follows that arbitration agreements containing class
action waivers in all forums are unenforceable because they are illegal
under the NLRA.144
Furthermore, Respondents’ reliance on Concepcion in claiming
that the saving clause may not be invoked is misplaced. Unlike the
cautionary tales described in Concepcion, the NLRA-granted right
that the agreement here violated does not derive its “meaning from
the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue,” or discriminate
against arbitration alone.145 The NLRA also does not disfavor
contracts that “have the defining features of arbitration
agreements.”146 Again, Petitioners do not deny that arbitration can be
a sufficient means of adjudication.147 Rather, they argue that
mandating individual arbitration as the only available legal recourse
for an employee disregards the underlying policy concerns of the
Concepcion (Concepcion), 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)) (internal quotations omitted).
142. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (stating that “an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon the grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract”); Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426
(2017), (holding that “The FAA cares not only about the ‘enforce[ment]’ of arbitration
agreements, but also about their initial ‘valid[ity]’—that is, about what it takes to enter into
them” when analyzing § 2).
143. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 1–2.
144. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 83–84 (1982) (quoting Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24, 34-35, 68 S. Ct. 847, 853, 92 L.Ed. 1187 (1948) (footnotes omitted)). The Court
asserts that courts must refrain from enforcing contracts that would violate “restrictions and
limitations of the public policy of the United States” established in federal statutes. Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
145. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333.
146. Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1426.
147. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 9.
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NLRA.148 The supposed virtues of arbitration, including its
informality and low cost, are not foregone just because the
proceedings are brought by a group of employees.149 In fact, allowing
for one group to bring a common claim or set of commons claims is
more efficient than a separate proceeding for each individual’s
claim(s). The integrity of the arbitral forum is not undermined by
allowing claims to be brought by a group.150 Finally, the Supreme
Court has consistently indicated that the saving clause addresses the
revocability, validity, and enforceability of arbitration agreements,
which undermine Respondents’ contention that the clause only
applies to the formation of contracts.151
To hold arbitration in a higher regard than the workers’ rights to
work for their mutual aid or protection also violates the equal
treatment principle, which demands that arbitration is given the same
effect as judicial proceedings.152 Ensuring that an employee has a
choice to participate collectively does not mean that individual action
is extinguished, or that the arbitral forum becomes less forceful. The
FAA was enacted to preserve equal treatment for arbitration and the
judicial forum. It was not enacted to subvert employees’ rights.
Therefore, prioritizing the FAA over the NLRA to this extent is as
inconsistent with the equal footing principle as completely
disregarding arbitration in favor of the protections of the NLRA. For
the foregoing reasons, the saving clause should be invoked to maintain
the equal might of the FAA and the NLRA, and preserve the
legitimacy of the arbitral forum.
Based on the precedent discussed in Respondents’ argument, it is
difficult to determine whether the Court will find a contrary
congressional command “specific” enough within the NLRA to
override the FAA. But, because they are coequal statutes, it would
appear that weighing their countervailing underlying policies is a
148. Id. at 11.
149. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350–52.
150. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 9 (“Section 2’s saving clause preserves the
Board’s rule invalidating agreements that require employees to individually arbitrate workrelated claims. That rule is not based on hostility towards arbitration, which the Board
recognizes as an effective forum for vindicating federal laws. It is based on longstanding laborlaw principles developed without reference to arbitration, which implement the NLRA’s
express bar on employer interference with employees’ right to act together for mutual
protection. The rule is entirely neutral with respect to the forum.”).
151. See, e.g. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). But see
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 354 (Thomas, J., concurring).
152. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
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useful exercise to determine which might be a better course. The FAA
protects the procedure and integrity of arbitration agreements.153 It
was enacted to provide legitimacy to an alternative to court
proceedings that is efficient, informal, and economic.154 Arbitration
reduces the burden on courts and provides litigants with a speedier
road to recovery.155 These are valuable goals and the federal policy
and case law clearly demonstrate a tradition favoring arbitration in
pursuit of those goals. The NLRA, however, protects people. In an
employee-employer relationship more power rests with the employer,
especially if the employee must face the employer alone. This is why,
by way of the NLRA, Congress sought to ensure that individuals may
gather with each other to seek relief for common disputes.156
Inhibiting individuals from the opportunity to engage in this form of
justice-seeking measures skirts around the NLRA itself and offends
its mission.157
Respondents have not shown that the FAA has ever preempted a
directly on point federal law.158 On this question before the Court, in
which the FAA is up against an equally powerful federal statute that
directly protects an interest at risk in this arbitration agreement, the
Court must consider why Congress was concerned about the
employee-employer relationship. In determining how those policy
concerns outweigh the economy provided by the FAA, the Court
153. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339. While courts must place arbitration agreements on
equal footing with other contracts, they will not enforce them “upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract” according to the saving clause. Id.
154. Id. at 350–52. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 (1974)
(asserting that “it is the informality of abitral procedure that enables it to function as an
efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution”).
155. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58.
156. See Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978) (holding that within § 7, the
74th Congress established its intention to protect concerted activities from employer retaliation
when employees sought to improve working conditions).
157. See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (“The inequality of bargaining power between
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association
substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce . . . [E]xperience has proved that
protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by
removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees.”).
158. See, e.g., Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (holding that the FAA preempted California’s
judicial rule on the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts);
Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1429 (2017) (holding that Kentucky’s
clear statement rule violates the FAA’s mandate).
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must be mindful that ruling in favor of Respondents enables
employers to mandate that employees bring actions alone. This result
would eviscerate the NLRA, leaving it toothless to protect
institutionally vulnerable people.
CONCLUSION
In its review of Murphy Oil v. N.L.R.B., the Supreme Court must
reckon with complex and somewhat conflicting statutory law, case law,
and policy concerns. A victory for the employers risks foreclosing any
opportunity for effective claim relief for employees across countless
industries and sectors. Due to this catastrophic result, the Supreme
Court should preserve the fundamental mission of the NLRA, and
decide that seeking justice collectively outweighs a slightly faster
process.

